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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kelly Lucas Johnson entered a conditional guilty plea to felony possession of a controlled
substance. Mindful of the applicable authorities, Ms. Johnson asserts on appeal that the district
court erred when it denied her motion to suppress.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
One evening, Officers Baughman and Reimers of the Boise Police Department went to
Ms. Johnson’s residence. (See R., p.32.) According to the district court’s findings of fact from
the motion to suppress hearing, the officers were there in response to “a call to dispatch
regarding a potential domestic violence, so they were validly and legitimately at the
residence . . . checking on the personal safety of the residents.” (See Tr., p.67, Ls.6-11.)1 One
officer heard yelling inside the house before they entered the house. (Tr., p.67, Ls.12-14.) Both
officers immediately smelled marijuana when they crossed the threshold into the residence. (Tr.,
p.67, Ls.14-16.)
The officers investigated the domestic call, separating Ms. Johnson and the male
individual reportedly involved in the domestic violence. (See Tr., p.68, Ls.16-21.) One of the
officers also spoke with Ms. Johnson’s sister, who had made the call to dispatch. (See Tr., p.68,
Ls.21-24.) After concluding the domestic violence investigation and determining there was no
personal threat to either Ms. Johnson or the male individual, the officers turned to the smell of
the marijuana. (See R., p.69, Ls.5-11.)
The district court found that Ms. Johnson had initially told the officers there was not
another person in the house, and then she recanted and said there was. (Tr., p.67, Ls.18-20.) She
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also stated they had not been smoking marijuana, but recanted and said they had been smoking
marijuana with a person that afternoon. (See Tr., p.67, Ls.20-23.) When the officers asked if she
had marijuana, Ms. Johnson at first stated it was just for personal use, but then paused and stated
the person from that afternoon took it with her. (See Tr. p.67, L.23 – p.68, L.5.)
According to the district court, about two-and-a-half minutes into that conversation, the
officers asked for Ms. Johnson’s consent to search. (See Tr., p.69, Ls.12-16.) Ms. Johnson
initially told them no, stated she did not think she should be searched for smoking, and asked
whether the officers needed a warrant. (See Tr., p.69, L.23 – p.70, L.2.) One officer responded,
“I don’t need a warrant if you consent.” (Tr., p.70, Ls.3-4.) The officers then explained “if they
have to get a warrant, the process, the house would be locked down,” and “the officers won’t
leave the house while they are seeking a warrant and that it will take time. And that they are less
likely to work with an individual if they have to pursue that route.” (Tr., p.70, Ls.12-18.)
Ms. Johnson then went to her bedroom and handed one of the officers a container with
marijuana inside. (See Tr., p.72, Ls.12-22.) The officer told her providing the marijuana was not
sufficient, and he still needed to search the bedroom. (See Tr., p.72, L.22 – p.73, L.5.) The
district court found Ms. Johnson then indicated that the officer could search the rest of the
bedroom. (See Tr., p.73, Ls.1-5.) By this time, Ms. Johnson was upset and may have been
crying. (See Tr., p.73, Ls.6-8.) The officer told her the marijuana was not a big deal, and he was
not going to arrest her that night. (See Tr., p.73, Ls.8-13.)
In the bedroom, the officer found a small baggy of methamphetamine inside an eyeglass
case. (See R., p.33; Tr., p.26, Ls.9-21.) Ms. Johnson admitted ownership of the eyeglass case
and methamphetamine. (See R., p.33; Tr., p.26, L.22 – p.27, L.4.)
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All citations to “Tr.” refer to the transcript of the September 22, 2017, motion to
2

The State later charged Ms. Johnson by Information with one count of possession of a
controlled substance, felony, I.C. § 37-2732(c), for the methamphetamine, and one count of
possession of a controlled substance, misdemeanor, I.C. § 37-2732(c), for the marijuana. (R.,
pp.24-25.) She entered a not guilty plea to the charges. (R., p.28.)
Ms. Johnson then filed a Motion to Suppress, requesting an order “suppressing evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 17, of the Idaho Constitution.” (R., p.30.) In her Brief in Support of
Motion to Suppress, Ms. Johnson asserted her “consent was not voluntarily given, and was in
fact the result of police duress and/or coercion and should be suppressed.” (R., pp.31-37.)
Ms. Johnson asserted she did not want to consent to a search of her home, and initially denied
consent after the officers told her they did not need a warrant if they had consent. (R., p.34.)
She asserted the officers essentially threatened her with being arrested and taken to jail if she
forced them to get a warrant, while enticing her with the idea that if she cooperated by granting
consent, they would not take her to jail. (See R., p.35.) Ms. Johnson asserted she “ultimately
capitulated to these risk/reward tactics and gave up her marijuana.” (R., p.35.)
Ms. Johnson further asserted the officers afterwards continued to ask for her consent to
search, and “[s]he was reluctant to comply, but eventually capitulated with further assurances
that they would not arrest her and take her to jail.” (R., p.35.) Ms. Johnson asserted her
resistance to the officers’ “numerous requests to search her home was repeatedly beaten down by
officers alternately threatening her with going to jail, or cajoling her with promises of not taking
her to jail if she cooperated.” (R., p.35.) “Responding to a domestic dispute they quickly
concluded was ‘unfounded,’ the officers refused to leave and badgered and cajoled Ms. Johnson

suppress hearing.
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over the course of more than 2 hours, until they broke down her resistance and obtained
capitulation to their request for consent to search her home.” (R., p.35.) Ms. Johnson concluded,
“Given the circumstances surrounding police questioning of Ms. Johnson and the search of her
bedroom, her consent to search was not freely and voluntarily given, but was the result of police
duress and/or coercion, and all evidence of that search should be suppressed.” (R., pp.35-36.)
The State filed a State’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.
(R., pp.38-45.) At the motion to suppress hearing, Ms. Johnson and the officers testified. (See
generally Tr., p.6, L.14 – p.58, L.24.) The district court subsequently informed the parties it had
reviewed the officers’ body camera footage from the incident. (See Tr., p.66, Ls.7-12. See
generally State’s Ex. 1.) The district court found “the evidence from the body cameras is the
best evidence of what occurred,” and “the defendant’s testimony, as well as the defendant’s
motion, simply to be an inaccurate summary of what occurred on that evening.” (Tr., p.66, L.23
– p.67, L.5.) The district court determined Ms. Johnson had not been truthful with the officers.
(See Tr., p.68, Ls.6-10.) The district court also determined, “And based on the officer’s training
and experience, I am confident that when they smelled the marijuana and you admitted that you
had been using marijuana that afternoon, that there was probable cause that they could have
gotten a warrant.” (Tr., p.68, Ls.10-15.)
The district court found the officers properly investigated the domestic violence report,
rather than immediately start investigating the marijuana they smelled upon entering the
residence.

(See Tr., p.68, L.25 – p.69, L.4.) The district court determined that, after the

conclusion of the domestic violence investigation, it was within the officers’ discretion to pursue
the criminal activity related to the marijuana smell. (See Tr., p.69, Ls.5-11.) The district court
framed the issue as, “when they asked for your consent, and this conversation takes
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approximately two and [a] half minutes, not hours, whether that conversation and discussion
rises to the level of coercion.” (Tr., p.69, Ls.12-16.)
First, the district court observed, “In considering the totality of the circumstances and the
factors discussed in the relevant case law, it is clear that an officer’s indication that he will seek a
warrant does not render subsequently consent to the search involuntary.” (Tr., p.69, Ls.17-22.)
The district court then determined Ms. Johnson was aware of her right to say no and require the
officers to obtain a warrant. (See Tr., p.70, Ls.5-11.) Additionally, the district court did not
believe that the officers’ “statements about the warrant process or about the ramifications
ultimately being different, that you may be arrested if they find illegal controlled substances after
the warrant, that that did not create a badgering, threatening, intimidating, coercive situation.”
(Tr., p.70, Ls.19-25.)
Next, the district court determined that, while the officers were uniformed and armed,
they were calm and professional, and their demeanors were consistent throughout their response.
(See Tr., p.71, Ls.1-10.) The district court determined, “So that fact that they responded in the
manner that they did is not overly threatening.” (Tr., p.71, Ls.10-12.) While the district court
acknowledged Ms. Johnson had been under a lot of stress, it found, looking at the totality of the
circumstances, that “the actions of the officers, it is just unrealistic that they would be deemed to
be coercive in nature, directly or impliedly, to forcing you to consent to the search of your
residence.” (See Tr., p.71, L.13 – p.72, L.2.)
The district court found State v. Ballou, 145 Idaho 840 (Ct. App. 2008), was “a case
directly on point to this case being very similar in the facts presented where the Court of Appeals
did not find that the consent was involuntarily given or subject to duress or coercion.” (Tr., p.72,
Ls.3-11.) The district court determined Ms. Johnson’s consent, where she provided the officers
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the marijuana, was voluntary. (See Tr., p.72, Ls.12-24.) The district court then determined
Ms. Johnson’s subsequent consent to the search of the bedroom was also voluntary. (See Tr.,
p.72, L.22 – p.74, L.20.) The district court determined the officer had the right to request to
search the bedroom based on Ms. Johnson handing over the marijuana, and that Ms. Johnson’s
recollection of the events was not credible. (See Tr., p.74, Ls.4-15.)
The district court determined “that the consent was given freely and voluntarily and it
was not the result of coercion, either direct or implied, and therefore the search pursuant to the
consent is an exception to the requirement for a warrant.” (Tr., p.74, Ls.16-20.) Thus, the
district court concluded, “the search of the residence as well as specifically the bedroom, those
[searches] were not unlawful and the motion to suppress is denied.” (Tr., p.74, Ls.20-23.)
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, Ms. Johnson agreed to plead guilty to the
felony methamphetamine possession count, and the State agreed to dismiss the misdemeanor
marijuana possession count. (See R., pp.59-63.) Ms. Johnson retained her right to appeal the
denial of her motion to suppress. (See R., pp.61-62.) Later, the district court imposed a unified
sentence of five years, with one year fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed Ms. Johnson on
probation for a period of five years. (See R., pp.66-73.)
Ms. Johnson filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment of
Conviction, Suspended Sentence, and Order of Probation. (R., pp.74-77.)

6

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Johnson’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Johnson’s Motion To Suppress

Mindful of the applicable authorities, Ms. Johnson asserts the district court erred when it
denied her motion to suppress. The Idaho Supreme Court has held: “The standard of review of a
suppression motion is bifurcated. When this Court reviews an order granting or denying a
motion to suppress, it accepts the trial court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
However, this Court freely reviews the trial court’s application of constitutional principles in
light of those facts.” State v. Eversole, 160 Idaho 239, 242 (2016) (citation omitted).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Evidence obtained in violation of this constitutional
protection generally may not be used as evidence against the victim of the illegal government
action. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810-11 (2009). This exclusionary rule “applies to
evidence obtained directly from the illegal government action and to evidence discovered
through the exploitation of the original illegality, or the fruit of the poisonous tree.” Id. at 811.
“Any warrantless search or seizure of a citizen is presumptively unreasonable unless if
falls within certain specific and well-delineated exceptions.” Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833
(2002). “When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by the defendant, the State bears the
burden to show that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement is applicable.” Id.
“Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 488
(2007). To fall within the exception, consent to a search must be voluntary. See id. “Whether
consent was voluntary, as opposed to being a product of coercion, is a question of fact to be
determined in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” Id.
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The Idaho Supreme Court in Smith held, “the well founded advice of a law enforcement
agent that, absent a consent to search, a warrant can be obtained does not constitute coercion.”
Id. at 489 (quoting United States v. Faruolo, 506 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1974)). Similarly, in
State v. Ballou, 145 Idaho 840 (Ct. App. 2008), the case the district court here found was
“directly on point” (see Tr., p.72, Ls.3-11), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that, where officers
had probable cause to obtain a search warrant, telling a person they could obtain a warrant did
not render the person’s consent to search involuntary. See Ballou, 145 Idaho at 848-49.
The Ballou Court was also not persuaded that the officer’s statement to the person “that,
if she refused consent to search, she would be handcuffed and detained rendered her consent
involuntary.” See id. at 848. This was because if the person “had denied the officer’s initial
request to enter her apartment and search . . . then the officers would have been justified in
precluding her from returning to the apartment where she potentially would have been able to
destroy evidence or pose a threat to officer safety as they searched the apartment.”

Id.

Additionally, in State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 774 (Ct. App. 2006), the Idaho Court of
Appeals held, “an officer’s implied or explicit offer not to arrest a suspect if he ‘turns over what
he has’ is not coercive if it merely informs the suspect of the officer’s intention to do something
that is within the officer’s authority based on the circumstances.” Garcia, 143 Idaho at 779-80.
In Garcia, an officer told the defendant that if he turned over what he had, he would be cited, and
if he did not turn over what he had, and had drugs on his person, he would be subject to arrest.
See id. at 779. The Garcia Court held that the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant
for delivery of marijuana, and “the statement was an informational communication regarding
authority the officers actually possessed and did not ipso facto render Garcia’s consent
involuntary.” See id. at 780.
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Mindful of Smith, Ballou and Garcia, Ms. Johnson asserts the district court erred when it
denied her motion to suppress. As Ms. Johnson asserted before the district court, after she
initially refused consent to search, the officers “essentially threatened her with being arrested and
taken to jail if she forced them to get a warrant,” while also enticing her with the idea that they
would not take her to jail if she cooperated. (See R., p.35.) Ms. Johnson “ultimately capitulated
to these risk/reward tactics and gave up her marijuana.” (See R., p.35.) Further, as Ms. Johnson
asserted before the district court, after the officers continued to request consent to search the
bedroom, she “eventually capitulated with further assurances that they would not arrest her and
take her to jail.” (See R., p.35.) In sum, as Ms. Johnson asserted before the district court, the
officers “broke down her resistance and obtained capitulation to their request for consent to
search her home.” (See R., p.35.)
Thus, Ms. Johnson’s consent to search was not voluntary, in light of all of the
surrounding circumstances here. See Smith, 144 Idaho at 488. The officers’ warrantless search
of her bedroom was therefore unlawful. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 821. The evidence obtained as
a result of the search should have been suppressed. See State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 663
(2006). The district court’s judgment, and the order which denied Ms. Johnson’s motion to
suppress, should be vacated.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Ms. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
district court’s judgment, vacate the order which denied her motion to suppress, and remand the
case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 24th day of October 2018.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
_
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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